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1Abstract
This paper integrates the analysis of choices on education and on technology adoption
to study international economic disparities. Two candidate explanations are considered:
di¤erences in distortions that a¤ect the cost of technology adoption and di¤erences in the
e¤ectiveness of schools. The implications of these two factors for di¤erences in output per
capita, educationalattainment, andthe age of technologiesacross-countries are assessedin a
vintage capital model with technology-speci…c learning-by-doing. Predictions are obtained
for a parameterized economy that matches US aggregate observations and evidence on
learning. Di¤erences in investment distortions produce plausible correlations only if the
major role of education is to improve the ability to learn technologies. On the other hand,
di¤erences in school e¤ectiveness produce plausible results only if the role of education is
to provide a productive ability that is independent of learning.
? This paper is based on Chapter 3 of my PhD dissertation at Universitat Pompeu
Fabra under the supervision of Ramon Marimon. My thanks go to him for useful advice
as well as to Jordi Caballé, Antonio Ciccone, Javier Díaz-Jiménez, Stephen L. Parente and
Gilles Saint-Paul for useful discussions and criticism. In particular, S. Parente’s comments
have led to substantial improvements in various parts of the paper. The paper has also
bene…ted from constructive comments by two referees and the editor Boyan Jovanovic. All
remaining errors are my sole responsibility. This paper was presented at the SED 1999
Meeting in Sardinia. A previous version had been circulated under the title "Education,
Technology Adoption and Productivity".
21 Introduction
There are persistent di¤erences in income per capita across countries. A major task of
economic analysis is to identify the factor or set of factors that constitute ultimate causes
of these di¤erences. Some recent studies -which include Parente and Prescott (1994) and
Jovanovic and Rob (1998)- focus on the role of factors that a¤ect the adoption of technolo-
gies. In the growth literature, other papers - including Lucas (1988), Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 5)- have emphasized the impor-
tance of the incentives for education. This paper integrates the analysis of both education
and technology adoption in the context of a vintage-capital model with technology-speci…c
learning-by-doing. The objective is to assess di¤erent factors as explanations of observed
international disparities.
The paper focuses on the role of two such factors motivated by some recent empirical
studies. The …rst is di¤erences in policies that a¤ect the resource cost of capital equipment
that embodies new technology. Several papers such as Jones (1994), Chari et al. (1997)
and Jovanovic and Rob (1998) …nd the price of capital to be negatively correlated with
international income levels. The second factor is di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of schools.
Measures of school inputs-e.g., teacher/pupil ratio, government expenditures, number of
school hours- in Barro and Lee (1997) are positively related with the level of develop-
ment. The idea of school e¤ectiveness here may also include the presence of policies and
institutional distortions that a¤ect educational outcomes for given measured inputs.
The importanceofthesetwofactorsas explanations ofinternationalincome di¤erences is
evaluatedby requiringthatthe implied signsof the relationships betweenincome percapita,
educational attainment and the age distribution of machines be empirically consistent.
More precisely, the criterion adopted in this paper is that, for a factor to qualify as a
sensible explanation of disparities, the implied di¤erences in output per capita must be
positively related to di¤erences in measures of educational attainment in population1 and
negatively related to di¤erences in the average age of machines2. One objective of this
paper is to explore whether and when the e¤ectiveness of education and/or distortions that
a¤ect the cost of technology adoption pass this qualitative test.
The key feature of the model is the choice by agents on the length of schooling and
the sequence of subsequent technology adoptions in the presence of exogenous embodied
3technological change and technology-speci…c learning-by-doing. Two di¤erent roles for ed-
ucation are considered. One assumption is the learning hypothesis, according to which
education improves the ability of economic agents to learn new technologies. This assump-
tion is motivated by early works on human capital by Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch
(1970) and Schultz (1975) which emphasize that education has a value in a changing en-
vironment that requires the ability to adapt to (or to learn) new technologies. The other
assumption postulates that education provides a productivity advantage which is indepen-
dent of experience. It will be referred to as the neutrality hypothesis. This assumption
is found in much of the growth literature like, for example, Lucas (1988), Grosman and
Helpman (1991,chapter 5), and Bils and Klenow (1998).
Balanced-growth output comparisons are conducted for economies that di¤er in school
e¤ectiveness and investment distortions. The benchmark economy roughly matches US ag-
gregate observations and evidence on learning processes. The …ndings from the numerical
exercise are as follows. Under the learning hypothesis, the model predicts positive correla-
tions between per capita output, education and a lower machine age only when economies
di¤er in adoption costs. In this case, the response of the pattern of technology adoption is
key to the predicted e¤ects. Under the neutrality view, only variation in school e¤ective-
ness predicts the right signs for these correlations. In this case, the decisions on technology
adoption play a mere supportive role. The results are informative as to mechanisms that
may be important ingredients in a theory of international disparities.
In that the interaction between education and technology is analyzed to explain eco-
nomic di¤erences, this paper relates to a body of literature that includes Stokey (1991),
Ciccone (1996), Keller (1996), Restuccia (1997) and Jovanovic (1998). In the present pa-
per, the nature of this interaction is as follows. How much education individuals acquire
depends on the expected pace of adoption of new technologies they will have to learn and
operate after their education; on its part, the pattern of adoption of new technologies is
in‡uenced by the level of educational skills of the workers and managers that have to learn
and operate those technologies. Here this interaction can be analyzed because the problem
of adoption/replacement of technologies over time with technology-speci…c learning has
been explicitly worked out. This di¤ers from the other papers cited that do not analyze
this type of problem and cannot, therefore, analyze this connection. They assume, rather
than derive, some form of technology-skill complementarity that brings automatically to-
4gether the skilled agents and the advanced technologies. In this sense, one contribution
of the present analysis is to provide a model with stronger micro-foundations that allows
to examine how the relation between education and technology may be altered by policies
and the role of education.
The modelalsosharesfeatures withrecent analyses ofthechoiceofreplacement/adoption
of technologies indynamic settings in Parente (1994), Cooley et al. (1997), Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1996), Klenow (1998), Jovanovic and Rob (1998) and Parente (1999). In Par-
ente (1994) andParente (1999), learning is not completelytechnology-speci…c and education
is treated parametrically. Jovanovic and Rob (1998) do not consider learning-by-doing nor
education but endogenize the creation of new technologies. In Klenow (1998) there is no
education either but there is variable labor intensity in production which a¤ects learning-
by-doing; here the technology is of …xed-coe¢cients and learning depends on the passage
of time. Cooley et al. (1997) introduce education, but it a¤ects the creation of technologies
rather than their adoption. In Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1996) …rms hire skilled workers
to accelerate learning, which resembles the learning assumption made here.
Ofall thesepapers, only JovanovicandRob(1998)andParente (1999)analyze sources of
long-run disparities in international income levels. Both papers quantify the level e¤ects of
investment distortions which are found to be small, although somewhat larger in Parente
(1999) where adoption of below-frontier technologies is allowed. While introducing the
endogenous response of education, the present paper does not improve the quantitative
implications found in these other papers. Parente (1999) also explores the level e¤ects of
parameters that are associated with the assumptions on education made in the present
paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
analyzes the optimal choices on technology adoption and education. Section 4 de…nes and
characterizes balanced-growth equilibria. Section5 calibrates the model andreportssteady-
state comparisons associated with di¤erences in adoption costs and school e¤ectiveness
under bothassumptions on theroleof education. Conclusions andremarks aboutdirections
for future research in section 6 conclude the paper.
52 The Model
Demographics
The economy is populated by a continuum of overlapping generations of agents. Each
agent faces a constant probability of death per unit of time, p, which is independent of age.
The size of population is normalized to one by letting the size of each new cohort be equal
to p. Then pe¡p(t¡¿) is the measure of agents born at ¿ that are alive at time t. In the …rst
part of his life, an agent goes to school for a length of time s. In the remaining part of his
life, he produces output by operating a …rm.
Output technology
There is a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption or investment.
Each …rm produces output using one machine. The ‡ow of output of a …rm depends on
the quality of the machine in use, on the agent’s technology-speci…c expertise, and on the
agent’s general skill. The quality of the machine is given by the technology embodied in it
and I index technologies over the positive real line by a. Expertise in a technology, q, can
take on only two values, 1 and ±, with ± > 1. General skill is represented by a positive real
number h. Output of a …rm that operates a machine of quality a with technology-speci…c
expertise q and general skill h is
h ¢ q ¢ a; (1)
with q 2 f1;±g and a; h 2 R+.
At any instant of time, a …rm may either switch to a more advanced technology or
continue to use the present one. I call technology adoption the decision to operate a new
technology by replacing the current machine with another of di¤erent quality.
If the …rm’s experience in the use of its current technology is shorter than a period
of length ¹, its level of expertise in this technology is 1. Thereafter, its level of expertise
in this technology increases to ±. Figure 1 depicts the typical path of technology-speci…c
expertise.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This learning-by-doing is technology-speci…c. Thus if the …rm decides to switch tech-
6nologies, no part of the expertise in the previous technology can be carried over to the new
one3.
The upper bound on the technologies that can be used by any …rm at time t is denoted
by A(t). This frontier technology grows at a constant and exogenous rate ° over time.
Switching to a technology a requires an expenditure of ¼ ¢ a units of output in the
machine embodying that technology. The parameter ¼ is a policy parameter that a¤ects
the resource cost of a machine.
Education
The length of time, ¹, that it takes for a …rm to accumulate expertise in a technology
is determined by the schooling of the agent that runs it. The years of schooling of an agent
is denoted by s. The value of ¹ depends negatively on the time an agent spends in school.
In particular, ¹ is assumed to be a non-increasing function of s, ¹(s). More speci…cally,
¹ = ¹(s) ´ ¹0e
¡¸s; (2)
with ¹0 and ¸ being non-negative constants. This view of schooling is referred to as the
learning hypothesis.
Schooling can also a¤ect an agent’s general level of skill, h. I assume h to be a non-
decreasing function, h(s), of s. Speci…cally,
h = h(s) ´ h0s
¯; (3)
with h0 and ¯ being non-negative constants. This view of schooling is referred to as the
neutrality hypothesis4.
I will interpret ¸ and ¯ as measuring the e¤ectiveness of individual time spent in the
class-room. This school e¤ectiveness may certainly depend on the quality and quantity of
educational inputs other than individual time. But it may also include policy distortions
and institutional factors that spur or hamper the acquisition of the relevant skills. For
instance, national educational programs that emphasize contents not directly usable in
production will have a smaller ¯; schemes that emphasize information acquisition rather
than analytical skills and critical awareness will be associated with smaller ¸.
7Preferences, markets and the distribution of wealth
An agent belonging to cohort ¿ has preferences de…ned over life-time streams of con-
sumption. Because of lifetime uncertainty, utility is evaluated in expected terms and is
represented by
E
"
1
1¡ ¾
Z ¿+T
¿
e
¡½(t¡¿)c(t;¿)
1¡¾dt
#
;
where T is time-until-death, c(t;¿) is the ‡ow of consumption to an agent of cohort ¿ at
time t, ½ is the subjective time-discount rate, and ¾ is the relative rate of risk aversion.
Since the probability of death, p, is constant, T is an exponential random variable with
density pe¡pT and utility can be rewritten as
1
1¡ ¾
Z 1
¿
e
¡(½+p)(t¡¿)c(t;¿)
1¡¾dt: (4)
There is a perfect capital market where agents can borrow and lend. There is a market
for insurance where insurance companies make premium payments tothe living in exchange
for receipt of their assets in the event they die. Free-entry in this market implies that the
insurance premium equals p per unit of time. When an agent dies, the …rm she is operating
is dissolved and there is no market for discontinued …rms.
The agent is assumed to have a wealth given by the life-time present value of per-
capita output minus adoption costs. The correct interpretation is to think of the agent as
belonging to an extended family where all members of all ages share overall family output
at every point in time5.
3 Optimal Individual Choices
The objective of an agent is to maximize the utility function in equation (4) taking prices
as given. Since I focus on balanced-growth equilibria, I consider a constant interest rate
r. This problem has two parts. The …rst part is that the agent maximizes the present
life-time value of the …rm he operates. This choices maximizes the agent’s wealth since it
maximizes its contribution to the present value of net output per capita. Towards this end,
an agent of cohort ¿ has two choices to make. First, he chooses how long to attend school,
s. Second, after school has been completed, the agent decides which technologies to use at
every instant over his productive life. The choices that maximize a …rm’s present value can
8be found in two steps. First, given a choice s, and hence ¹ and h, it is possible to solve
for the optimal pattern of technology adoption. Having obtained the optimal technology
adoption decisions as a function of s, it is possible to …nd the optimal schooling level that
maximizes the present value of the …rm. The second part of the agent’s problem is that the
agent, as a consumer, chooses a path for consumption that maximizes utility subject to the
constraint that the discounted present value of consumption does not exceed his wealth.
In this section, I characterize the optimal technology adoption and schooling decisions
of an agent born at time ¿. Section 3.1 shows that optimal technology adoption results in
a sequence of evenly spaced dates at which the …rm switches to the frontier technology and
stays there until the next upgrade. The e¤ect of parameters on the frequency of technology
upgrades is analyzed. The optimal schooling choice can then be determined. Section 3.2
analyzes this decision and highlights the mechanisms underlying the response of schooling
and technology adoptionto changes ininvestment distortions and school e¤ectiveness under
two views about the role of education.
3.1 Technology Adoption
I begin by assuming that the agent has already chosen s and so the values of ¹ and h
have already been determined. Before describing this problem formally I de…ne a feasible
adoption plan. Exposition is simpli…ed by noting that the assumption ¼ > 0 rules out the
optimality of plans characterized by continuous switching of technologies. Thus, without
any loss, I ignore this possibility in the following de…nition.
De…nition 1: Given the path for the frontier technology A(t), a feasible adop-
tion plan for an agent born at time ¿ with schooling s is de…ned by:
(i) A sequence fxjg representing the dates at which each jth adoption occurs
for j = 1;2;:::;J, such that xj ¸ ¿ + s and xj+1 > xj. The number of
adoptions, J, may be either a positive integer -in which case I adopt the
convention that xJ+1 = +1- or in…nity.
(ii) A path for technologies represented by a function a(t;¿) de…ned for t ¸
¿ + s such that a(t;¿) ￿ A(t), and a(t;¿) constant for t 2 (xj;xj+1) all
j = 1;2;:::;J.
9The technology in (1) and the structure of learning imply that a feasible adoption plan
generates the following path for the …rm’s output, y(t;¿),
y(t;¿) =
8
> <
> :
h ¢ a(xj;¿) t 2 [xj;minfxj+1;xj + ¹g)
h ¢ ± ¢ a(xj;¿) t 2 [minfxj+1;xj +¹g;xj+1)
(5)
Now the problem of a …rm consists of maximizing the present value of output net of
adoption costs by choosing a feasible adoption plan or making no adoption at all. To
characterize the solution it is convenient to set up the objective more formally.
The existence of an insurance premium implies that the agent discounts values at the
rate r+p. De…ne by mj the length of the period over which the jth technology is operated
in a feasible adoption plan, i.e. mj ´ xj+1¡xj. The present discounted value as of date xj
of net output accruing between xj and xj+1 can then be expressed as h ¢ a(xj;¿) ¢ W(mj)
where
W(mj) =
1
a(xj;¿) ¢ h
¢
"Z xj+mj
xj
e¡(r+p)(t¡xj)y(t;¿)dt¡ ¼ ¢ a(xj;¿)
#
=
8
> <
> :
1
r+p[1 ¡ e¡(r+p)mj] ¡
¼
h mj < ¹
1
r+p[1 +(± ¡ 1)e¡(r+p)¹ ¡ ±e¡(r+p)mj] ¡
¼
h mj ¸ ¹
(6)
is an increasing, bounded, continuous and piece-wise di¤erentiable function of mj. Thus
the present value as of date ¿ + s associated with a feasible adoption plan can now be
expressed as the following discounted sum of net values accruing from the adoption and
use of di¤erent technologies,
h ¢
J X
j=1
W(xj+1¡ xj) ¢ a(xj;¿) ¢ e¡(r+p)(xj¡(¿+s)) (7)
The problem of the …rm is to choose the adoption plan that maximizes the value of expres-
sion (7) if it is positive or else remain inactive and produce zero. I will characterize the
solution when the size of investment distortions is not too large and the frontier technology
does not advance too fast. This is the case when the two following conditions hold.
C1: limm!+1W(m) = (1+ (± ¡ 1)exp(¡(r + p)¹))=(r + p) ¡ ¼=h > 0.
C2: r + p¡ ° > 0.
10Assuming C1 rules out inactivity as an optimal choice and then C2 restricts the class of
feasible adoption plans that are optimal. Proposition 1 states this result more precisely6.
Proposition 1: If conditions C1 and C2 hold then:
a. An optimal choice involves a feasible adoption plan with adoption of the
frontier technology, i.e. a(xj;¿) = A(xj) all j = 1;2;:::;J.
b. In an optimal feasible adoption plan the …rst adoption occurs at ¿ +s, i.e.
x1 = ¿ +s.
Since the technology to be adopted when upgrading is always the frontier, solving for
the optimal timing of adoptions will complete the characterization of the adoption choice.
By proposition 1 the objective in (7) can be cast in recursive form. This leads to the
following result.
Proposition 2: Assume C1 and C2 hold. In an optimal adoption plan xj+1 ¡
xj = m all j = 1;2;:::;J where m 2 R+ solves,
V = max
m fW(m) + e
¡(r+p¡°)mV g; (8)
and the resulting V is such that
A(¿ + s) ¢ h¢ V (9)
is the value of the expression in (7) in an optimal plan.
This proposition says that optimal upgrades occur at a constant frequency because the
…rm faces the very same problem (8) any time it has to decide for how long to hold out a
new machine. Still, the number of adoptions, J, can be either 1 [if m = +1] or in…nity [if
m < +1]. The solution also delivers the value V which is W(m)=(1¡exp(¡(r+p¡°)m))
when evaluated at the optimal m. Then, the maximized value of the objective (7) can be
calculated as (9).
I now proceed to characterize the solution to problem (8). This problem is a one-
stage optimization program. The only di¢culty arises because the assumption of learning
as a step function creates a discontinuity in the derivative of the objective at m = ¹.
11Nonetheless, theoptimal m canstill be characterizedas a solution toa …rst-order condition.
Proposition 3 establishes this result as well as the procedure to …nd the solution.
Proposition 3: Assume C1 and C2 hold. Then:
a. A solution to (8) implies m < +1 and must satisfy
¢(m) ´ W0(m)¡ (r + p ¡°)
e¡(r+p¡°)m
1¡ e¡(r+p¡°)mW(m) = 0: (10)
b. If lim¹¡¢(m) > 0 then the solution to (8) is the unique root of (10)
with m > ¹. If lim¹¡ ¢(m) < 0 and lim¹+ ¢(m) < 0 then the solution
to (8) is the unique root of (10) with m < ¹. If lim¹¡ ¢(m) < 0 and
lim¹+ ¢(m) > 0 then there are two roots of (10), one on each side of ¹.
The solution to problem (8) is the one root that yields the highest value of
W(m)=(1¡ exp(¡(r +p ¡ °)m)).
According to this proposition, solving (8) only requires to …nd the values of m that
solve the …rst-order condition (10). The procedure in part b indicates that there are at
most two such values and exactly determines when the solution is to be found for values
that are smaller than ¹, larger than ¹ or both. To understand the statements, it helps
to depict ¢(m) as a piece-wise concave function that starts positive, eventually becomes
monotonicallydecreasingandexhibits apositiveright jump at ¹ whereyetthe sloperemains
continuous.
I will now use the …rst order condition (10) to shed some light on the determinants of
the time between adoptions m. Proposition 3b recognizes that a change in parameters may
induce a discontinuous response of m if it implies a move from a plan where learning occurs
[i.e. m > ¹] to a plan where more frequent upgrades imply that learning does not occur
[i.e. m < ¹], or the other way around. This notwithstanding, here I will focus on changes
that produce a local response when m > ¹. It helps intuition to use (6) to rearrange (10)
as,
± = (r + p¡ °)
e°m
1¡ e¡(r+p¡°)mW(m) (11)
The two-sides of this equation contain, respectively, the normalized values for the marginal
bene…t and marginal cost of m. As I am looking at a situation where m > ¹, the marginal
12bene…t of m consists of the current ‡ow of normalized output on the current technology,
±. The marginal cost consists of the discounted foregone present value that would arise on
switching to a new machine whose quality exceeds the current one’s by a factor exp(°m).
It is optimal to pick m so that these two values are equalized.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to understand how the pattern of tech-
nology adoption is a¤ected by investment distortions, ¼, and education, h and ¹. These
parameters show up within W(m) in condition (11). Furthermore, by (6), the role of h
and ¼ for technology adoption is entirely captured through the ratio ¼=h. In other words,
general skill dampens the presence of investment distortions. One can …gure out the e¤ect
of slower learning-by-doing, lower general skill or higher investment distortions on optimal
m. By reducing W(m), both larger ¹ and larger ¼=h produce a downward shift of the
marginal cost leading to larger m, which implies less frequent technology adoptions.
3.2 Schooling Choice
The length of schooling attendance, s, is decided optimally taking into account its e¤ects
on the value of the …rm which, in turn, depends on the response of technology adoption
choices. To analyze this problem, it is useful to represent explicitly the dependence of the
value of the …rm on ¹ and ¼=h. Let V(¹;¼=h) denote the value that solves (8) as a function
of these two variables. Then, by (9) in proposition 2, the value of the …rm can be written
as A(¿ +s)¢h¢ V(¹;¼=h). The agent’s goal is to maximize the present discounted value of
this expression as of date ¿. The technology of education described in (2) and (3) and the
assumption that A(t) grows at rate ° therefore imply that the agent solves
max
s¸0
e¡(r+p¡°)sh(s)V(¹(s);¼=h(s)) (12)
s:t: ¹(s) = ¹0e¡¸s
h(s) = h0s
¯
Since proposition 3 implies that m in program (8) can be bounded, application of the
maximum principle implies that the objective of this program is continuous in s. Without
an upper bound on s, existence of a solution cannot be generally established though.
Next,the specialized problems that arise under two speci…c assumptions on education
13are considered. The analysis will focus on each case separately to draw the implications of
changes in investment distortions, ¼, and measures of the e¤ectiveness of schooling, ¸ and
¯, for the optimal level of schooling s that solves (12).
3.2.1 The Learning Hypothesis
In this case, the parameter ¯ is assumed to be zero so that h is not a¤ected by s. Without
loss of generality, I normalize h = 1 by setting h0 = 1. Assume that a solution to (12) is
interior, implies m > ¹ and is characterized by a …rst-order condition which must read,
dV (¹(s);¼=h)
d¹
¹
0(s) = (r + p¡ °)V (¹(s);¼=h) (13)
which equates marginal bene…t (left) and marginal cost (right) of s7.
Now, consider the e¤ect of an increase in ¼ on this equation. The marginal cost on
the right, V(¹;¼=h), is reduced which tends to dictate higher schooling s. This is an
opportunity-cost e¤ect. On the other hand, m goes up so adoptions of technology become
less frequent. This reduces the marginal bene…t of education on the left-hand side of (13):
less frequent adoptions make the ability to learn new technologies provided by education
less valuable. This tends to reduce the optimal time spent at school. Thus investment
distortions may have a negative impact on educational attainment only because of this
latter e¤ect.
On its part, a lower quality of education, ¸, also produces e¤ects on both sides of (13).
Again, the opportunity cost onthe right-hand side is reducedwhich works infavor of longer
schooling. On the left-hand side of (13), the marginal bene…t falls as larger ¹(s) as well as
the consequent rise of m reduce the marginal gainof speedingup learningthrough schooling
(the ¡dV=d¹ term). This tends to reduce schooling. Finally, there is the e¤ect from the
direct impact on ¹0 that may have either sign on the marginal bene…t8.
3.2.2 The Neutrality Hypothesis
In this case, the parameter ¸ is assumed to be zero so that ¹ is not a¤ected by s. As
before, assume that a solution to (12) is interior, implies m > ¹ and is characterized by a
14…rst-order condition which must read,
¡
dV (¹;¼=h(s))
d(¼=h(s))
¼
h0(s)
h(s)
+h
0(s)V(¹;¼=h(s)) = (r + p ¡°)h(s)V (¹;¼=h(s)) (14)
which equates marginal bene…t (left) and marginal cost (right) of s. The marginal bene…t
includes the increase in disembodied productivity h as well as the e¤ect on the value of the
…rm through the term ¼=h9.
Consider a rise in ¼. Ignoring for the moment the response of the …rst term on the
left-hand side, the e¤ect on V(¹;¼=h(s)) shifts both marginal cost and marginal bene…t
downwards, but the absolute shifts of marginal cost is bigger which tends to increase s10.
But the …rst component of the marginal bene…t will also change. In particular, the fact
that m increases, and hence adoptions become less frequent, brings about a reduction of
the marginal bene…t of reducing the adoption cost term, ¼=h, through education. This
tends to dictate lower education.
A reduction in the e¤ectiveness of schools also reduces the second term on the marginal
bene…t side as well as the marginal cost. The …rst term of the marginal bene…t will also
decrease except for the possibility that the rise in the marginal return of education due to
larger ¼=h is quantitatively substantial.
4 Equilibrium
The exercises conducted in the previous section suggest that when the choice of technology
is endogenized, the response of schooling to changes in various parameters cannot gener-
ally be determined. I now proceed with the characterization of a balanced-growth path
equilibrium. I will then be able to pin down reasonable parameters values and therefore
obtain predictions for di¤erences in output per capita, educational attainment and the age
of capital producedby di¤erences in the level of investment distortions and the e¤ectiveness
of schools.
I study balanced-growth equilibrium paths along which all aggregate quantities grow at
a constant rate and the interest rate is constant. I de…ne such an equilibrium as follows.
De…nition 2. Given ¾, ½, p, ±, °, ¼, ¹(:), h(:), and a distribution of wealth
Z(¿), a competitive balanced growth equilibrium is a constant m denoting the
15spacing between adoptions, a constant level of education s, a distribution of
output per …rm y(t;¿), a path for per-capita output y(t), a distribution of
individual consumption c(t;¿), a path for per-capita consumption c(t), and a
constant interest rate r, such that:
1. Taking r, s , ¹(s) and h(s) as given, y(t;¿) is determined by (5) for an
optimal technology adoptionplan by a …rm ofvintage ¿+s characterizedin
propositions 1through3, withm being the optimal length of time between
adoptions.
2. Taking r as given, s is optimal in that it solves (12).
3. Given r, c(t;¿) maximizes utility of the agent of cohort ¿ in (4) subject
to the constraint that the present value of consumption cannot exceed his
wealth Z(¿),
Z 1
¿
c(t;¿)e¡(r+p)(t¡¿)dt = Z(¿):
4. Market clearing and aggregate consistency. Aggregate consumption equals
aggregate output minus investment11,
c(t) = y(t) ¡
pe¡ps
1 ¡ e¡pm¼A(t); (15)
with
c(t) =
Z t
¡1
pe
¡p(t¡¿)c(t;¿)d¿;
and
y(t) =
Z t¡s
¡1
pe
¡p(t¡¿)y(t;¿)d¿:
5. c(t) and y(t) grow at a constant rate.
6. Conditions C1 and C2 hold.
Points 1 and 2 in the de…nition require that agents behave optimally. By point 6 and
the results in section 3, the individual path of output then results from writing (5) for a
feasible plan with xj+1 ¡ xj = m all j and a(xj;¿) = A(xj). This yields,
16y(t;¿) =
8
> <
> :
h(s)A(¿ + s +(j ¡ 1)m) if ¿ + s + (j ¡1)m ￿ t < ¿ + s +(j ¡ 1)m+ ¹
h(s)±A(¿ +s + (j ¡ 1)m) if ¿ + s + (j ¡1)m +¹ ￿ t < ¿ +s + jm
where m ands solve (8) and (12) respectively. The formula for aggregate output inpoint 4,
which takes into account the age structure of population, can then be developed to obtain
y(t) =
1 X
j=1
Z t¡s¡(j¡1)m
t¡s¡jm
pe
¡p(t¡¿)y(t;¿)d¿
= A(t)
p
° + p
e¡ps
1¡ e¡pmR(m;s) (16)
with
R(m;s) =
8
> <
> :
1 ¡ e¡(°+p)m m < ¹(s)
(1 ¡ e¡(°+p)¹(s))+ ±(e¡(°+p)¹(s)¡ e¡(°+p)m) m > ¹(s)
Hence, aggregate output grows at the same rate as the frontier technology ° and, by
the market-clearing condition (15) in point 4, so does aggregate consumption and, hence,
point 5 in the de…nition holds. It remains to …nd for which interest rate r, if any, per-
capita consumption, c(t), calculated by aggregation of individual consumption, c(t;¿), is
consistent with the market clearing condition in (15). With the preferences described by
(4) and the assumption of free borrowing and lending, point 3 implies that individual
consumption, c(t;¿), grows at a constant rate °c with
°c =
r ¡ ½
¾
: (17)
To add up consumption of the di¤erent agents, it is necessary to be speci…c about the
distribution of wealth across cohorts Z(¿). The assumption of the model is that Z(¿) is
the present value of net output per capita over the agent’s lifetime,
Z(¿) =
Z 1
¿
"
y(t) ¡
pe¡ps
1 ¡ e¡pm¼A(t)
#
e¡(r+p)(t¡¿)dt: (18)
Using the intertemporal budget constraint in point 3 andconstant growthrates °c and ° for
individual consumption and aggregate net output respectively, the condition for aggregate
17consumption in point 4 can be rewritten as
c(t) = p
r + p¡ °c
r +p ¡ °
1
p¡ °c + °
"
y(t) ¡
pe¡ps
1¡ e¡pm¼A(t)
#
: (19)
In a balanced growth equilibrium, the market clearing condition (15) must be satis…ed
for consumption as given in (19) and growth of individual consumption as in (17). Simple
inspection indicates this holds for r = ° and for °c = °. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 4: Assume Z(¿) is given by (18) and conditions C1 and C2 hold
for r = ° and r = ¾°+½. Then the economy has two balanced growth equilibria.
The type-1 equilibrium has r = ¾° + ½ and °c = °. The type-2 equilibrium has
r = ° and °c = (r ¡ ½)=¾.
To develop the intuition, notice that on a balanced growth equilibrium individual con-
sumption must grow at a constant rate. There are di¤erent such paths that satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint and market clearing. In the type-1 equilibrium, individual
consumption is growing at the same rate as per-capita net output at every time. In this
case, all agents of all ages have the same consumption level equal to per-capita net output.
Another path consistent with market clearing is associated with the type-2 equilibrium. If,
as I will assume later, ¾ ¸ 1, then consumption declines relative to net individual income
over the life-cycle so that young agents borrow and old agents lend. A complete analysis
of the stability properties of the two equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Numerical Experiments
I will analyze numerically the e¤ect of di¤erences in investment distortions and the e¤ec-
tiveness of schools on the two types of balanced growth equilibria. To this purpose, I need
to assign values to the parameters of the model. To impose some discipline, in section
5.1 parameters values will be selected so that the equilibrium of the benchmark economy
mimics observed features of the US economy. Then, insection5.2, I will be able to compare
balanced-growth path equilibria of di¤erent economies. Solving for an equilibrium involves,
…rst, calculating the interest rate as in proposition 4, second, compute optimal adoptions
18and schooling by solving (8) and (12), and, …nally, compute output in (16) and a measure
of the average age of machines in operation12. Section 5.3 considers modi…cations to the
basic model. The …ndings will be discussed in section 5.4.
5.1 Calibration
Inorder to be abletomatchobservations on the interest rate and output growth, thetype-1
equilibrium is chosen to select the benchmark parameters. The parameters of the model
are: °, p, ½, ¾, ±, ¼, h0, ¯, ¹0 and ¸. I will calibrate these parameters under two di¤erent
assumptions about the role of education. These two assumptions are the learning and the
neutrality hypotheses discussed in section 3. For each of the two calibrations, I use the
following procedure.
1. Set calibration targets for long-rungrowth rate of output per-capita, risk-free interest
rate, life-expectancy, speed of learning-by-doing, progress ratio, investment/output
ratio, years of schooling and general skill.
2. Choose °, ¾ and ½ so that, using proposition 4, the targets for the growth rate of
output per capita and the risk-free interest rate in step 1 are matched. Choose p so
that 1=p matches the target for life-expectancy in 1. Choose ± consistent with the
progress ratio in 1.
3. Fix values of s and h consistent with the targets in step 1.
4. Pick a value for ¼.
5. Pick a value for ¹.
6. Compute the optimal adoption length m.
7. Check outcome is consistent with target for speed of learning in 1. If not, update ¹
and go back to 6.
8. Check outcome is consistent with target for investment/output ratio in 1. If not,
update ¼ and go back to 5.
199. Choose parameters h0, ¯, ¹0 and ¸ so that the optimal choice of schooling s and h(s)
matches the values s and h …xed in step 3, and ¹(s) matches the ¹ found as output
of steps 4-8.
I will now describe the choice of values for the targets in step 1. I use an average growth
rate ofoutput per capita of2 per cent anda risk-free interest rateof 4.5 per cent. Life in the
model starts after early childhood so life-expectancy is set at 66.66 years, which is in line
with …gures in Barro and Lee (1994). Following the choice in Klenow (1998), the progress-
ratio is …xed a priori to 2. Studies on learning-by-doing indicate that progress ratios
vary widely across plants, sectors and industries. The choice made here can be justi…ed
as a rough average of various pieces of evidence13. To measure the speed of learning I
draw on evidence in Bahk and Gort (1993) and Bessen (1997) that learning is exhausted
after approximately 5 years. For the investment/output ratio I use 7.3 per cent share of
equipment investment in GNP from NIPA. Given that the model excludes investment on
the intensive margin, I take as satisfactory an investment/output ratio around 6.4 per cent.
The target …gure for educational attainment is 10 years. Average education in population
in US over age 25 was 9.36 years in 1965 and 11.78 in 1985. Finally, the value of general
skill is normalized to 1.
In step 7, I want to verify if the implied choices are consistent with the target set
for the speed of learning in step 1. Since in the model learning is a step function, to
use that evidence an approximation must be done. Consider a parameterized version of
the learning-curve used in Parente (1994) which expresses output as a function of time,
2¡(2¡1)exp(¡1:4565t). This continuous-learning curve involves the target progress ratio
of 2 and is roughly consistent with the evidence in that, after 5 years, learning involves
growth less than 0.05 per cent14. I will move on to step 8 when ¹ and ¼ are such that the
model’s learning process is equivalent to this continuous learning process in the sense that,
for the model’s optimal m, the two processes yield the same value for the …rm15.
Finally, in step 9 the computation of the optimal choice of s is done on a discrete grid.
In all the calculations, the objective in problem (12) is well de…ned with the possibility
(under the learning hypothesis) of a local maximum at s = 0. Table 1 summarizes the
choices of parameters.
20INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
5.2 Balanced-Growth Comparisons
This section considers the balanced-growth e¤ect of increases in the size of investment
distortions, ¼, and decreases in school e¤ectiveness, ¸ or ¯, relative to the benchmark
economy. Figures on educational attainment s, relative income per capita y=yUS, and the
average age of machines are reported. The length of technology adoptions, m, is also
reported. The fact that the interest rate remains una¤ected in either type of equilibrium
means that the analysis in section 3 carries over to interpret the results.
5.2.1 Type-1 equilibrium
Table 2 below reports …gures associated with various values of ¼ under the two assump-
tions about the role of education for type-1 equilibria. The …rst row corresponds to the
benchmark economies.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Under the learning hypothesis, the return to education is closely linked to the pattern
of technology adoptions. As discussed in section 3.2.1, higher size of distortions that a¤ect
the cost of equipment tend to reduce the frequency of technology updates and the opportu-
nities for learning. Thus education that improves learning ability is less valuable andagents
reduce the period of time spent inschool. In the parameterized economy analyzed here, this
mechanism dominates the e¤ect of a lower opportunity costs of time. A lower frequency of
technology adoptions increases the average age of technology and reduces aggregate pro-
ductivity. Hence, in the calibrated model, cross-country variation in investment distortions
creates a positive correlation between output per capita and educational attainment, and
a negative correlation with the age of the machines in operation.
Under the neutrality hypothesis, the prediction for the correlation output-years of
schooling is the opposite. Section 3.2.2 showed that, much like under the learning as-
sumption, the higher cost of equipment reduces the frequency of technology upgrades.
21Thus education, to the extent that it contributes to reduce the perceived cost of adoptions
(through the term ¼=h), becomes less valuablewhich tends to shortenthe optimal schooling
period. But in this economy, this e¤ect is too weak as compared with the response to the
reduction in the opportunity cost of schooling time.
The e¤ect of changes in measures of the e¤ectiveness of schools is illustrated in table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Under the learning hypothesis for education, di¤erences in ¸ predict a negative associ-
ation between educational attainment and output. In this economy, a lower ¸ leads to a
reduction in the opportunity cost of schooling time that overwhelms the other e¤ects dis-
cussed in section 3.2.1. In particular, it is true that the induced rise in m tends to reduce
the value of education, but in this case this e¤ect is too weak.
Under the neutrality view of education, as discussed in section 3.2.2, a reduction in ¯
reduces the direct marginal return of education as well as the indirect return from reducing
the e¤ective cost of technology adoption ¼=h. These creates incentives for shorter schooling
that dominate the response to a lower opportunity costs of schooling time. Thus lower
e¤ectiveness of schools reduces schooling and output per capita. In addition, it increases
the e¤ective adoption cost, ¼=h(s), thereby raising the average age of capital and reducing
output per capita further.
5.2.2 Type-2 equilibrium
With these parameters, type-2 equilibria are associated with a lower interest rate than
type-1 equilibria. Hence the model produces higher levels of investment in education and
output. Comparisons of type-2 balanced growth equilibria arising from di¤erences in ¼, ¸
and ¯ under the two assumptions on the role of education lead to exactly the same type of
conclusions as for type-1equilibria. Tables4 and5 reportthe results ofthecomputations for
type-2 equilibria under the parameters in table 1. The two scenarios that deliver plausible
correlations between output, educational attainment and the age of capital are the same
as when comparing type-1 steady-states in section 5.2.1.
22INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
5.3 Robustness and Extensions
With parameters calibrated to the type-2 steady-state, the qualitative …ndings remain the
same. Also, the nature of the results seems robust to alternative parameterizations and
interpretations of parameters within the model. Concerning the latter, the interpretation
of ¹0 and h0 as measures of the e¤ectiveness of schools leads to the same results. However,
the model itself contains simplifying assumptions that at this stage deserve to be examined
more carefully. The …rst is the assumption on the distribution of wealth as expressed in
equation (18). The second is the assumption of learning as a discrete process. In the
remaining of this section, I will examine alternative assumptions and demonstrate that the
results derived so far remain largely intact.
5.3.1 The distribution of wealth
Analternative to (18) is the more natural assumption that an agent’s lifetime wealth, Z(¿),
consists of the value of the …rm he or she operates. This amounts to replace (18) by the
following,
Z(¿) = A(¿)e¡(r+p¡°)sh(s)V (¹(s);¼=h(s)); (20)
where the notation is the same as in problem (12). The equilibrium conditions apply to
this case. Furthermore, a modest amount of work shows that, under the assumption on the
distribution of wealth contained in (20), the characterization of balanced-growth equilibria
is similar to that provided in proposition 4. As in that proposition, r = ° is an equilibrium.
Thus the type-2 equilibrium characterizes a balanced-growth pathirrespective ofthe wealth
distribution. Moreover, for all the economies analyzed under the assumption in (20), I
have found that there is another equilibrium that, in terms of the value of r relative to the
one in the type-2 equilibrium, resembles the type-1 equilibrium of proposition 4. However,
di¤erently from the type-1 equilibrium under assumption (18), when (20) holds the interest
rate cannot be characterized analytically and, in general, will change when parameters of
the model change. Hence in this economy there will be richer general equilibrium e¤ects
from changes in ¼, ¸ or ¯. I study the scope of these new e¤ects for economies that
23have the benchmark parameters in table 1 under the learning hypothesis. For the sake of
comparability, for the neutrality hypothesis I have adjusted ¯ = 0:425 and h0 = 0:38. Now
computing equilibria requires an additional round of iterations on the interest rate.
The results of the experiments for type-1 equilibria under (20) are illustrated in tables
6 and 7. The signs of the correlations do not di¤er from the ones found with a constant
interest rate. The model also delivers predictions for the correlation between output and
the interest rate. This correlationis negative except for the changes in the school parameter
under the neutrality assumption.
INSERT TABLES 6 and 7 ABOUT HERE
5.3.2 Continuous learning
Assumelearning-by-doingisa smoothfunction of time. In particular, lettechnology-speci…c
skill, q(m), be governed by the following version of the learning curve in Parente (1994),
q(m) = ± ¡(± ¡ 1)e
¡¹m;
where ± still represents the progress-ratio and ¹ measures the speed of learning. I maintain
the other assumptions of the model. In this case, propositions 1 and 2 still hold and the
solution to the adoption problem is the unique solution to a smooth …rst order condition.
Di¤erently from the case with discreet learning, now the qualitative e¤ect of ¹ on the
optimal frequency of adoptions is ambiguous. The same arguments as before lead to the
two balanced-growth path equilibria in proposition 4. I choose the analogous to equation
(2) to be speci…ed as ¹(s) = ¹0s¸. I calibrate this model to the same targets as the
discreet-learning model for the type-1 equilibrium. This results in exactly the same values
for parameters other than those of the schooling technology in table 1. The parameters of
the schooling technology that di¤er from those in table 1 are as follows. Under the learning
hypothesis, ¹0 = 1:4566 £10¡9 and ¸ = 9:0. Under the neutrality hypothesis ¹0 = 1:4566.
Figures for comparisons of balanced-growth paths for di¤erent ¼, ¸ and ¯ are displayed
in tables 8 and 9. They are virtually identical to those for the model with learning as a
step function in tables 2 and 3.
24INSERT TABLES 8 and 9 ABOUT HERE
5.4 Discussion.
A theory of cross-country disparities must be consistent with the fact that richer countries
tend to be more educated and use more advanced technologies. Under the learning as-
sumption of education, it is found that cross-country disparity caused by variation in the
size of investment distortions (but not in school e¤ectiveness) is consistent with a positive
association between output per-capita and the level of educational attainment. Under the
neutrality hypothesis, variation in school e¤ectiveness (but not in investment distortions)
has implications consistent with these relationships. Furthermore, under these two sce-
narios, the average age of technologies in operation declines with the level of income per
capita.
These results therefore illustrate the possible con‡icting implications of di¤erent as-
sumptions on the role of education. A relevant question at this stage is to decide which of
the two assumptions considered here is more reasonable. The learning hypothesis is explicit
about the sort of skills provided by education and has been invoked in a number of empir-
ical studies such as Welch (1970), Bartel and Litchenberg (1987), Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996) and Rosenzweig (1995). In addition, this view can be rationalized, as Rosenzweig
(1995) does, in the context of the information-theoretic model of learning in Jovanovic
and Nyarko (1996). This approach creates a link between technology and the returns to
schooling, and this paper has formalized this link and the analysis of its implications. The
analysis of technology adoption proves to be essential to the argument.
On its part, what I have called the neutrality hypothesis, however, appears to be less
explicit about what the skills involved are and where they come from. In this view, the
connection between technology and the returns to schooling is weaker and plays just a
supportive role. In other words, the predictions for schooling and output in a model that
ignores the technology adoption problem -formally, with V (¹;¼=h) replaced by a constant
in problem (12)- would be essentially the same.
All this notwithstanding, this paper cannot discriminate the two explanations ofdispar-
ities across countries as thelevel e¤ects associated withdi¤erences in schoolinge¤ectiveness
25and investment distortions are small under the two assumptions. This is not surprising for
the case of changes in investment distortions under the learning hypothesis. In this model,
like in Jovanovic and Rob (1998) and Parente (1999), di¤erences in the age distribution
of technologies alone can not produce wide di¤erences in income per capita. Only large
di¤erences in speeds of learning-by-doing coupled with a large learning ratio can amplify
the e¤ects. However, the response of education in the model seems unable to bring about
sizeable di¤erences in the speed of learning and thereby in output even when large progress
ratios are considered.
The quantitative properties of the model are surely related to its implications for the
returns to schooling. For the benchmark economy, the return to one more year of education
under the neutrality assumption is around 4 per cent for the type-1 equilibrium16. Under
the learning assumption, the …gure lies between 3.4-6.7 per cent. Bils and Klenow (1998)
document an average Mincerian return to schooling of 9.9 per cent on a sample of 52
countries. Hence the calibration of the present model seems to grossly underestimate the
return to education. This is more so for the type-2 equilibrium where the interest rate is
particularly low.
6 Conclusion and Final Remarks.
This paper integrates the analysis of choices on education and on technology adoption to
study international disparities. The analysis is conducted in a vintage capital model with
technology speci…c learning-by-doing. Unlike previous studies, this allows to evaluate the
importance of distortions that a¤ect the cost of technology adoption and the e¤ectiveness
of education by testing their implications for output per capita, educational attainment,
and the age of technologies in use. Remarkably, the analysis of technology adoption allows
to consider alternative assumptions on the role of education.
The …ndings for a reasonably parameterized version of the model are as follows. If the
role of education is to improve the ability to learn technologies, only di¤erences in the cost
of technology adoption produce consistent correlations. On the other hand, if the role of
education is to provide an absolute productive advantage that is independent of learning,
then only di¤erences in school e¤ectiveness produce consistent correlations.
Two main conclusions emerge from the analysis of this paper. First, predictions that
26can be obtained under supposedly simplifying assumptions on the role of education -such
as the neutrality hypothesis- may di¤er dramatically from the predictions derived under
other less-simplifying assumptions -such as the learning hypothesis. Second, in the model
analyzed changes in di¤erent factors yield di¤erent qualitative predictions. These di¤ering
implications can potentially be used to asses the importance of di¤erent factors in develop-
ment. However, the present paper stands far on the way to drawing stronger conclusions
in this sense. Not the least of the reasons is that the model’s quantitative predictions do
not accord with the data.
Directions for further research involve natural extensions of the present framework.
The model contains assumptions that impose tight bounds on the size of the di¤erences
in income that can be produced. Notably, all agents adopt the frontier technology and
learning is completely technology-speci…c. I think that a model analyzing the transmission
of knowledge across technologies, rather than uniquely its accumulation within each single
technology, o¤ersreasonableexpectations of bettermatching the data. Insucha framework,
the mechanisms analyzed here would still play an important role.
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297 Appendix: Proof of Propositions 1 Through 3.
Proof of proposition 1: C1 implies that the solution is a feasible adoption
plan (J;fxjg;a(t;¿)) since a feasible adoption plan with J = 1 exists where the
expression in (7) has a positive value.
I will now prove that in an optimal plan W(mj) > 0 for all j = 1;2;:::;J.
In an optimal adoption plan W(mj0) > 0 for some j0. Then W(m1) > 0
since, otherwise, the value in (7) would increase by holding on until x1 = xj0.
Finally, assume that, for some j in an optimal plan, W(mj) ￿ 0. Since W(:)
is monotonically increasing, the value in (7) would increase by holding out the
j ¡ 1th adoption until xj+1. But then xj cannot be the jth adoption which
contradicts the optimality of the plan containing xj.
Nowpart (a) follows from inspection of (7). To prove part (b), use that A(xj) =
A(¿ + s)exp(°(xj ¡ (¿ + s))) to rewrite (7) as
h¢ A(¿ + s) ¢
J X
j=1
W(xj+1 ¡ xj)e¡(r+p¡°)(xj¡(¿+s))
= h¢ A(¿ + s) ¢
J X
j=1
W(mj)e
¡(r+p¡°)(x1+
Pj¡1
i=1 mi¡(¿+s))
where the equality follows from the notation mj ´ xj+1 ¡ xj. Therefore, for
any given sequence of tenures fmjg, by anticipating the start of production [i.e.
reducing x1] the value of (7) increases unambiguously by assumption C2. That
¿ + s is the earliest feasible starting date concludes.Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2: The results in Proposition 1 imply that (7) can be
written as
h ¢ A(¿ +s)¢ V (fmjgJ
j=1);
with
V (fmjg
J
j=k) ´
J X
j=k
W(mj)e
¡(r+p¡°)
Pj¡1
i=k mi:
So the problem is to choose J and fmjg that maximize V (fmjgJ
j=1). The
30objective can be written recursively as
V(fmjg
J
j=k) = W(mk) +e
¡(r+p¡°)mkV (fmjg
J
j=k+1);
for k = 1;2;:::;J. Let Vk ´ maxV (fmjgJ
j=k). Since the value V (fmjgJ
j=k) only
depends on the sequence oftenures, the solution must be the same value V = Vk
for all k. Hence the problem is equivalent to solving (8). Expression (9) follows
from the de…nitions.Q.E.D.
Proof proposition 3: To simplify notation, let D(m) ´ e¡(r+p¡°)m. At points
m 6= ¹ the derivative of the objective in (8) is given by W0(m)+D0(m)
W(m)
1¡D(m).
By (8), at the optimum, V = W(m)=(1¡D(m)) and this derivative is given by
the left-hand side of (10) denoted by ¢(m).
It is helpful to write ¢(m) as
W
0(m) + D
0(m)
W(m)
1¡ D(m)
= e
¡(r+p)m¡(m);
where
¡(m) ´
8
> <
> :
1 ¡ e°m
h
r+p¡°
r+p (1 ¡(r +p)¼
h) +e¡(r+p)m °
r+p
i
if m < ¹
± ¡ e°m
h
r+p¡°
r+p (1+ (± ¡ 1)e¡(r+p)¹ ¡(r +p)¼
h) +±e¡(r+p)m °
r+p
i
if m > ¹
Thus I can analyze the shape of ¢(m) in (10) by analyzing ¡(m).
a. By C1 and C2 it follows that ¡(+1) < 0 which rules out the optimality
of m = +1.
By C2, ¡(0) > 0 which rules out m = 0. C2 also implies lim¹+ ¡(m) >
lim¹¡¡(m) which rules out optimality of m = ¹ where ¡(:) is non di¤er-
entiable. Any local extremum must then satisfy ¡(m) = 0.
b. A little algebra shows that in either region, m < ¹ or m > ¹, there can be
at most one root of ¡(m) = 0. This follows from the fact that, if for some
m ¡(m) is decreasing, then it is so for any larger m in either region.
It is useful to state this as a lemma.
31Lemma 1: Let m and m0 belong to either (0;¹) or (¹;1). As-
sume m0 > m. Then if ¡0(m) < 0, then ¡0(m0) < 0. If ¡(m) = 0,
then m is a local maximum.
Now I will take the di¤erent cases in turns.
– Case lim¹¡ ¡(m) > 0. By C2 one …nds ¡(0) > 0 and ¡0(0) > 0. Then,
by Lemma 1, lim¹¡ ¡(m) > 0 implies that ¡(m) > 0 all m < ¹. Thus
there is no m < ¹ such that ¡(m) = 0.
By C2 it follows that lim¹¡ ¡(m) < lim¹+ ¡(m). Then lim¹¡ ¡(m) > 0
implies lim¹+ ¡(m) > 0. Now C1 and C2 imply ¡(1) < 0 and then
there exists an m > ¹ such that ¡(m) = 0. Lemma 1 concludes
establishing this is unique and the maximum.
– Case lim¹¡ ¡(m) < 0 and lim¹+ ¡(m) < 0. C2 implies ¡(0) > 0. Then
lim¹¡ ¡(m) < 0 and Lemma 1 implies that there is a single m < ¹
such that ¡(m) = 0 which is a local maximum.
It is a fact that lim¹¡ ¡0(m) = lim¹+ ¡0(m). Since Lemma 1 implies
lim¹¡ ¡0(m) < 0, it follows that lim¹+ ¡0(m) < 0. Now the assumption
that lim¹+ ¡(m) < 0 implies that ¡(m) < 0 all m > ¹. Part a of this
proposition then concludes that the maximum is the m < ¹ such that
¡(m) = 0.
– Case lim¹¡ ¡(m) < 0 and lim¹+ ¡(m) > 0.
As in the previous case there exists one m < ¹ such that ¡(m) = 0.
Similarly, using that C1and C2 imply ¡(+1) < 0, there is also a local
maximum m > ¹. By (8), at the solution V = W(m)=(1 ¡ D(m)).
This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
328 Footnotes
1 In 1960, years of schooling averaged 1.39 in the poorest third of countries, 2.91 in the
middle third of countries, and 5.6 in the top third group of countries. The …gures for 1985
are 2.18, 4.67 and 7.94 years of schooling respectively. The …gures for years of schooling
are calculated from Barro and Lee (1993). Countries have been ranked according to …gures
on GDP per capita in Summers and Heston (1991) Mark 5.0.
2 There are not aggregate measures of the age of capital available for a large set of
countries. For the more developed economies, the …gures reported in Wolf (1991) show that
changes in economic leadership over the last century are related to changes in dominance
in new capital vintages. On the other hand, there is microeconomic evidence- for example,
Welch (1970), Bartel and Litchenberg (1987), and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996)- that
education a¤ects the choice of technology.
3 This is a simpli…cation with respect to Parente (1994) and Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1996) who allow for di¤erent degrees of transferability of knowledge across vintages. In
terms of Jovanovic and Nyarko, I am in case ® = 0 (in their equation (3)).
4 Rosenzweig (1995) identi…es two roles of education in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996)’s
Bayesian learning target-input model. First, the more educated may obtain more infor-
mation from each use of the technology as re‡ected in a lower variance of the optimal
target which speeds up the gain in the precision of optimal decisions. This is similar to my
learning hypothesis that education lowers ¹. Second, education may also improve access
to information sources as re‡ected in a lower variance of the prior about the input target
which improves the initial precision of decisions in a new technology. This information
prior assumption does not correspond to my neutrality hypothesis. It would be picked up
in my model by letting education raise h- just like under the neutrality assumption- and,
in addition, replacing ± by ±=h. Intuitively, if the initial productivity in a new technology
is higher, then the gain from experience is smaller for given full-potential productivity a±.
I think that my neutrality assumption could be accommodated in a version of Jovanovic
and Nyarko’s information setup where the posterior variance is bounded above zero (pos-
sibly introducing an additional source of noise) and education reduces this lower bound as
well as the prior variance. To my knowledge, this sort of analysis has not yet been carried
out andIhave toaccept that this hypothesis isless well founded onaninformation-theoretic
33model but seems to capture the practice in part of the literature on human capital.
5 This is a simplifying assumption that facilitates exposition. Another possible assump-
tion is that an agent’s wealth is given by the present value of the …rm he or she operates.
Section 5 shows that this more natural assumption has no substantive e¤ect.
6 With C1 but not C2, it is optimal to wait in…nity to start producing. Without C1, it
is optimal to produce zero. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are proved in appendix A
7 The discussionthatfollows reliesonthe following derivation. Usetheenvelope theorem
[i.e. Eq.(11)] to show that the …rst left-hand side term in (13) can be written as,
dV (¹(s);¼=h)
d¹
=
(1=(r +p))[¡(± ¡ 1)(r + p)e¡(r+p)¹(s)]
1¡ e¡(r+p¡°)m :
8 If lower school e¤ectiveness is represented by larger ¹0 rather than smaller ¸, then
¡¹0 goes up which works for larger s.
9 For the discussion that follows it is useful to calculate
¡
dV
d(¼=h)
¼
h0
h
= h
0
￿ 1
1 ¡ e¡(r+p¡°)m
¼
h
+ V(¼=h)
¸
:
Then the derivative of this expression with respect to ¼ is
h0¼
h
¡(r +p ¡ °)
1¡ e¡(r+p¡°)m
dm
d¼
< 0:
10 If V did not depend on h, then the two e¤ects would exactly cancel out.
11 The demographic assumptions made imply that pexp(¡pu) is the size of population
aged u. Therefore the measure of individuals adopting the frontier technology at any
instant along a balanced-growth path is pexp(¡ps) + pexp(¡p(s + m)) + pexp(¡p(s +
2m))+pexp(¡p(s+3m))+::: = [pexp(¡ps)]=[1¡ exp(¡pm)]. Investment is this number
times the cost of a new machine ¼A(t).
12 The average age of machines is computed as (1=°)log(A(t)=A(t)) with A(t) =
A(t)(p=(° +p))(1 ¡ exp(° + p)m)=(1 ¡ exp(¡pm)).
13 Rapping (1965) found a 40 percent yearly productivity growth in US ship-building
yards over 1941-1944. These …gures suggest alower bound for the progress ratio around3.3.
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) …t learning curves to productivity data on a number of new
activities. The data they use include progress ratios ranging from 111 to 3, but for many
34activities moremodest learning ratesare found. Other studies seemtosuggestthat progress
ratios are generally of the order or several percentage points only, much smaller than the
several-fold gains found in case studies. In Bahk and Gort (1993) the total productivity
gain is around 15 percent for recently-born plants (average 1 per cent per year over 14
years). On a sample of new plant start-ups in US manufacturing industries, Bessen (1997)
estimates an average progress ratio after learning is exhausted (5 years) of 5.7 per cent.
As Bessen (1997) points out, the case study literature shows that most of productivity
gains from learning occur initially over a short span of time. Thus low frequency data and
the loss of information on initial months of activity may explain why some studies- such as
Bahk and Gort (1993)- tend to underestimate the measures of learning or, in other words,
to overestimate initial productivity.
14 As mentioned in footnote 13, it seems that most learning accrues during the …rst
few months of an activity. Bessen (1997) argues that assuming that, on average, reported
annual data drops the …rst 6 months of activity helps to reconcile the di¤ering …ndings
across empirical studies on learning. The continuous-learning approximation to the current
calibration implies a half-life of 0.47, which means that after the …rst 6 months of activity
about a 30 per cent increase in productivity is left to be learnt. This is more in line with
the industry …gures found in Bahk and Gort (1993) and Bessen (1997).
Parente (1999) assumes a larger progress ratio and a somehow higher speed of learning.
15 In other words ,
W(m) =
Z m
0
e
¡(r+p)t[2¡ (2¡ 1)e
¡1:4565t]dt¡
¼
h
;
where m is the model’s optimal time between adoptions and W(m) is as in equation (6)
with ± = 2.
16 This number has beencalculatednumerically from theimpactonaggregate outputper
…rm of changing s exogenously from 9 to 10 and from 10 to 11. It is close to the percentage
change in h, ¯=s, thus suggesting that the e¤ect of education on output through ¼=h is
small in the margin.
35Table 1: Benchmark Economy
Learning hypothesis Neutrality hypothesis
¾ = 1:25 ½ = 0:02 ¹0 = 5000 ¹0 = 0:6728
° = 0:02 p = 0:015 ¸ = 0:8914 ¸ = 0:0
± = 2:0 ¼ = 1:12 h0 = 1:0 h0 = 0:43
¯ = 0:0 ¯ = 0:37
36Table 2. Type-1 equilibrium. Changes in investment distortions
Investment distortions Learning hypothesis Neutrality hypothesis
¼ s m y=yUS age s m y=yUS age
1.12 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18
1.72 9.9 13.06 0.987 6.17 10.3 12.81 1.0 6.06
2.32 9.8 15.11 0.973 7.08 10.5 14.61 0.987 6.86
2.92 9.8 16.86 0.960 7.84 10.8 16.26 0.979 7.58
3.52 9.7 18.74 0.946 8.64 11.0 17.85 0.973 8.27
Table 3. Type-1 equilibrium. Changes in school e¤ectiveness
E¤ectiveness Learning hypothesis E¤ectiveness Neutrality hypothesis
¸ s m y=yUS age ¯ s m y=yUS age
0.89 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18 0.37 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18
0.78 11.3 11.16 0.979 5.32 0.27 7.40 12.47 0.758 5.81
0.70 12.3 11.58 0.953 5.51 0.17 4.80 13.79 0.591 6.50
0.59 14.3 12.28 0.913 5.83 0.07 2.0 15.27 0.490 7.15
37Table 4. Type-2 equilibrium. Changes in investment distortions
Investment distortions Learning hypothesis Neutrality hypothesis
¼ s m y=yUS age s m y=yUS age
1.12 10.9 9.15 1.00 4.40 26.0 9.26 1.00 4.45
1.72 10.9 11.11 0.980 5.30 26.5 10.63 0.994 5.08
2.32 10.9 12.85 0.967 6.08 27.0 11.86 0.982 5.64
2.92 10.8 14.52 0.954 6.82 27.4 13.00 0.976 6.15
3.52 10.7 16.08 0.941 7.50 27.8 14.07 0.964 6.63
Table 5. Type-2 equilibrium. Changes in school e¤ectiveness
E¤ectiveness Learning hypothesis E¤ectiveness Neutrality hypothesis
¸ s m y=yUS age ¯ s m y=yUS age
0.89 11.20 8.90 1.00 4.29 0.37 24.90 9.31 1.00 4.47
0.78 12.60 9.07 0.974 4.36 0.27 19.30 10.57 0.734 5.05
0.70 13.80 9.19 0.954 4.42 0.17 12.40 12.16 0.556 5.77
0.59 14.90 10.72 0.902 5.12 0.07 5.20 13.88 0.444 6.54
38Table 6. Type-1 equilibrium. Changes in investment distortions
Alternative assumption on wealth distribution
Investment distortions Learning hypothesis Neutrality hypothesis
¼ s m y=yUS age r % s m y=yUS age r %
1.12 9.8 11.44 1.0 5.45 5.18 9.8 11.42 1.0 5.44 5.17
1.72 9.7 13.71 0.986 6.46 5.18 10.1 13.40 1.0 6.33 5.20
2.32 9.7 15.61 0.973 7.30 5.19 10.3 15.24 0.993 7.14 5.22
2.92 9.6 17.66 0.960 8.18 5.20 10.5 16.98 0.986 7.89 5.24
3.52 9.6 19.42 0.946 8.93 5.21 10.7 18.64 0.980 8.60 5.26
Table 7. Type-1 equilibrium. Changes in school e¤ectiveness
Alternative assumption on wealth distribution
E¤ectiveness Learning hypothesis E¤ectiveness Neutrality hypothesis
¸ s m y=yUS age r% ¯ s m y=yUS age r%
0.89 9.8 11.44 1.0 5.45 5.18 0.42 9.8 11.42 1.0 5.44 5.17
0.78 11.0 11.98 0.973 5.69 5.24 0.33 7.8 12.76 0.756 6.04 5.06
0.70 12.0 12.44 0.953 5.90 5.30 0.23 5.7 14.28 0.588 6.71 4.94
0.63 13.2 13.05 0.919 6.17 5.36 0.13 3.4 15.86 0.475 7.41 4.80
39Table 8. Type-1 equilibrium. Changes in investment distortions
Continuous learning
Investment distortions Learning hypothesis Neutrality hypothesis
¼ s m y=yUS age s m y=yUS age
1.12 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18
1.72 9.9 13.06 0.987 6.17 10.3 12.81 0.993 6.06
2.32 9.8 15.12 0.973 7.08 10.5 14.61 0.987 6.86
2.92 9.8 16.86 0.956 7.84 10.8 16.26 0.970 7.58
3.52 9.7 18.74 0.946 8.64 10.9 17.34 0.973 8.05
Table 9. Type-1 equilibrium. Changes in school e¤ectiveness
Continuous learning
E¤ectiveness Learning hypothesis E¤ectiveness Neutrality hypothesis
¸ s m y=yUS age ¯ s m y=yUS age
9.0 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18 0.37 10.0 10.85 1.0 5.18
8.56 11.0 11.36 0.980 5.41 0.27 7.40 12.25 0.756 5.81
8.11 12.3 11.80 0.946 5.61 0.17 4.80 13.79 0.591 6.50
7.44 14.6 13.17 0.886 6.22 0.07 2.00 15.27 0.490 7.15
40